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SECURITY DEVICES
Thomas A. Harrell*
SURETYSHIP
The surety who pays the creditor is given two avenues by which he
may obtain reimbursement from the principal debtor. The first is by
subrogation under Civil Code article 2161(3).' The second is by the direct
action for indemnity given by Civil Code article 3052.2 Although the two
remedies are intended to lead to the same end, the consequences may
be significantly different in certain cases if the surety chooses one or the
other.
If the principal obligation prescribes before the surety sues the debtor,
the claim of subrogation will be defeated. It has been held, however, that
the claim for indemnity only prescribes ten years after payment by the
surety.3 Recent cases illustrate other differences in the two remedies.
In American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Atkinson," a surety
guaranteed performance of a contract ostensibly entered into by one of
the two defendants. After payment, the surety brought suit against both
the person for whom it expressly agreed to be surety and the other defen-
dant, alleging the latter was in fact a joint venturer with the former. The
existence of the joint venture was denied, but the court concluded that
in fact such a venture had existed (but had since been terminated) and
that the venture was a real party in interest to the contract. The unnamed
venturer contended that since the surety had been surety only for the other
venturer, the surety's right of subrogation was limited to recovering from
the venturer expressly named in the suretyship. The second circuit rejected
this argument, finding the suretyship had in fact been given for the benefit
of the venture and that the defendant named in the agreement was acting
as its manager: Having found the obligation guaranteed to be that of
the venture and that the venture had been dissolved, the court concluded
that both venturers were liable to the surety. The finding that the venture
was bound on the principal debt and that the surety guaranteed its per-
formance for one of the venturers should have been all that was required
to hold the other. The right of subrogation given by article 2161 does
not permit the subrogated surety to recover only from the person for whom
he is surety. Rather, subrogation vests in the subrogated party (whether
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Article 2161(3) provides in part: "Subrogation takes place of right: . . . 3. For
the benefit of him who, being bound with others . . . had an interest in discharging [the
debt]."
2. Article 3052 provides in part: "The surety who has paid the debt, has his remedy
against the principal debtor .... "
3. Cleveland v. Comstock, 22 La. Ann. 597 (1870).
4. 420 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
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he be a surety or not) all of the creditor's rights upon the debt, and the
subrogee may recover from any person liable upon it.' If two persons
incur an obligation as solidary obligors, a surety for only one of them
should be able to recover, by way of subrogation, all of the debt from
the one for whom he is surety and one-half of the debt from the other.6
In Jamison v. Metroplex Investments,7 an accomodation endorser (who
is considered a surety under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) section
3-4158) brought suit upon the note against the maker for whom he was
a surety by accomodation, asking for the attorney's fees provided in the
note as well as its principal amount. The defendant resisted payment of
the attorney's fees, relying upon Smith v. White9 and McCardle v. Nagim,'"
which held that a surety who brings suit for indemnity under Civil Code
article 3052 may not recover attorney's fees even if they are provided
for in the principal obligation. The action for indemnity, being an in-
dependent personal action, was held subject to the usual rule that attorney's
fees are not recoverable in the absence of a contract. In Jamison, however,
the third circuit noted that the action before it was "on the note" and
that the accomodation surety is given the same rights as any other holder
enforcing it." The same result should follow in the case of a surety who
is not a party to the instrument but gives a separate suretyship. Since
he is subrogated to the debt, he should be able to collect any attorney's
fees incurred in its enforcement that are owed by the terms of the note.
Furthermore, the debt should bear interest as stipulated in the note, rather
than the legal interest that would be due under the right of indemnity.'"
5. DeCuir v. Carnes, 173 La. 563, 138 So. 103 (1931).
6. It is of course essential that the parties be liable in solido, otherwise each would
only owe his part of the debt. In the case of solidarity, however, the surety who satisfied
the obligation may proceed by subrogation against any party liable on the debt. If the solidary
obligor for whom the suretyship is not given is forced to pay the whole amount to the
other's surety, he will in turn be legally subrogated to the debt and be entitled to recover
the share of the other obligor from the latter and his surety. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2161(3),
3052. To avoid such a circuity of claims, the surety's rights against the other obligor should
be limited to the share of the debt that the person for whom he is surety is ultimately
to bear. See Phillips v. Pedarre, 156 La. 509, 100 So. 699 (1924) (resolving the similar
problem that occurs when a surety attempts to recover all of the debt from a cosurety
by way of subrogation).
7. 426 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
8. 2 U.L.A. 447-48 (1978).
9. 398 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
10. 61 So. 2d 267 (La. App. Orl. 1952).
11. Ford Motor Co. v. Soileau, 357 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
12. One implicit limitation upon the right of a surety to collect from the debtor either
by way of indemnity or subrogation is that he may recover no more than he has paid
the creditor to secure discharge of the debt. See Succession of Dinkgrave, 31 La. Ann.
703 (1879). However, he should be entitled to recover any interest that has accrued since
his payment, and if the subrogated surety has in fact been forced to retain an attorney,
the rule (which is based upon equitable considerations) should not bar his recovery of such
fees by way of subrogation.
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The situation involved in the Smith and McCardle cases should also be
distinguished from that where, because of the debtor's default, the surety
has been forced to pay attorney's fees to the creditor under the terms
of the principal obligation. In such a case, if the fees are owed to the
creditor by the debtor and the surety has guaranteed their payment, his
right to recover, even by way of indemnity, should be allowed; such
amounts are not "attorney's fees" incurred by the surety in his action
for indemnity but merely amounts he has paid the creditor and for which
he is entitled to be indemnified.' 3
The Civil Code also provides that the suretyship may not exceed what
is due the creditor or be contracted on more onerous terms.' The court
in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Melikyan'" properly noted that
this limitation does not apply to amounts owed under a contract between
the principal debtor and the surety made to induce the latter to give his
promise to the creditor.
PLEDGE
The Pledge of Rent
The pledge of rent accruing from a lease of immovable property may
be effectively accomplished in at least three ways. First, the law permits
the pledge of incorporeals such as rents by means of a written pledge,
with written notice thereof given to the lessee.' 6 Secondly, Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 9:4401 permits the pledging of rents by a written act recorded
in the conveyance records of the parish where the property is located.
The statute also provides that notice to the lessee is only required to make
the pledge "operative as to the lessee."'" Finally, the Assignment of Ac-
counts Receivable Act' 8 provides that a pledge may be effected by the
recording of a "notice of assignment" of "accounts" in the conveyance
records of the parish of the assignor's "place of business,"'" accompanied
13. A different question might arise if the attorney's fees are owed not because of
the principal debtor's default, but because the surety himself failed to perform and forced
the creditor to employ an attorney to collect from him.
14. LA. ClV. CODE art. 3037.
15. 430 So. 2d 1217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
16. LA. R.S. 9:4321-:4323 (1983); Traigle v. Ami, Inc., 280 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1973); see also Hamilton Co. v. Hughes, 141 So. 398 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932); cf.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 3158, 3160.
17. This clause is apparently intended to insure that the lessee may continue to pay
the rent to the lessor without liability to the pledgee.
18. LA. R.S. 9:3101-:3111 (1983), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 319, § 1.
19. If the assignor is a corporation or partnership, its place of business is the principal
place of business designated in the articles filed with the secretary of state. If the assignee
is neither a corporation nor a partnership "registered with the secretary of state" or if
the "assignor is not domiciled in the state," the place of business of the assignor is the
place at or from which the business of the assignor will be conducted "as set forth in
the Notice of Assignment." LA. R.S. 9:3103(B), (C) (1983), as amended by 1983 La. Acts,
1983]
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by a pledge of those accounts in the form prescribed by the Act." "Ac-
counts" 'are defined to include rents from the lease of an immovable. 2'
Notice of the pledge to the lessee is not required, although as under sec-
tion 4401, the lessee may safely continue to pay rent to the lessor until
he is notified of the pledge. 2 One way that such a pledge may not be
perfected, as the defendant in Toomer v. Lowenthal2 3 discovered, is by
including it in an act of mortgage filed in the mortgage records.24
The multiplicity of methods that are available for encumbering rents
presents a formidable task to the prospective creditor who wishes to ob-
tain such a pledge or-perhaps more importantly-to a prospective pur-
chaser of property subject to a recorded lease, who wants to be sure he
will be able to collect the rent in the future free of claims by a pledgee
of the seller. To ascertain whether the rents are encumbered, inquiry must
be made of the lessee to determine if he has been given written notice
of a specific pledge, and the conveyance records of the parish where the
immovable is located must be searched, as must the conveyance records
of the parish in which the "place of business" of the lessor (as defined
in the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act) is located.
The Pledge of Bank Accounts
The not surprising desire of banks to obtain as much security for
their loans as possible led to an interesting analysis of the proper method
by which security in bank accounts may be confected. In First National
Bank of Commerce v. Hibernia National Bank25 the Hibernia National
Bank (Hibernia) accepted deposits from a customer, issuing several "non-
negotiable" certificates of deposit for them. Hibernia then made a loan
to the customer for which it took a note containing a stipulation that
the loan was secured by every balance in the depositor's accounts with
the bank. The note also provided, in substance, that upon default all
moneys of the maker held on deposit by the bank could be applied to
the debt. The customer later borrowed money from the First National
Bank of Commerce (Commerce), pledging one of the Hibernia certificates
as security for its repayment. The pledge was evidenced by a written act
entitled "pledge and assignment" and the certificate of deposit was
No. 319, § 1. It is obvious that this need not, and in many cases will not, be the place
where the leased property is located.
20. LA. R.S. 9:3105 (1983), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 319, § 1.
21. LA. R.S. 9:3101 (1983), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 319, § 1.
22. LA. R.S. 9:3108 (1983), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 319, § 1.
23. 430 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
24. That such a provision in a recorded mortgage has efficacy seems to be a rather
commonly held misconception-probably because the additional act of sending notice of
the assignment to the lessee will perfect the pledge under the first method discussed above.
25. 427 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
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delivered to the bank. Commerce sent a copy of the pledge to Hibernia,
which returned it, noting thereon that it "acknowledged the pledge and
assignment." The customer defaulted upon Commerce's loan and the lat-
ter made demand upon Hibernia for payment of the certificate it held
in pledge. Hibernia defended upon the grounds that the customer's note
which it held (and which apparently was due) and the account represented
by the certificate pledged to Commerce had been extinguished by com-
pensation. In the alternative, Hibernia argued that if the account had not
been so extinguished, it enjoyed a pledge of the account superior to that
of Commerce by virtue of the security clause in its note. After rejecting
the compensation argument, the fourth circuit found that the pledge to
Hibernia of the account was not binding upon third persons (such as Com-
merce) because Civil Code article 3152 required the delivery of the cer-
tificate to the bank to render the pledge valid.2 6 The court distinguished
an earlier decision, Montaldo Insurance Agency v. Culotta,"7 in which
it held that a pledge of bank accounts by a depositor required no actual
delivery since the bank was already in possession of the account, on the
grounds that no written document evidencing the account existed in that
case. The court also relied upon Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Harper,"8
in which it was held that the delivery of a non-negotiable certificate of
deposit to the pledgee and the giving of written notice of the pledge to
the issuing bank are both indispensable prerequisites to the validity of
the pledge vis a vis third persons. The decision appears eminently correct.
Civil Code article 3158 provides in part:
When a debtor wishes to pledge . . written obligations of any
kind, he shall deliver to the creditor the . . . written obligations,
so pledged, and such pledge so made . . . shall without further
formalities be valid as well against third persons as against the
pledger thereof . . . provided that where the pledge of instruments
not negotiable, the debtor must be notified ....
MORTGAGES
The Collateral Mortgage
The bar still seems to have difficulty with the relationship of the col-
lateral mortgage note to the debt for which it is pledged. In Terrebonne
Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith,29 the mortgagor brought an injunction suit
to bar enforcement of a mortgage by executory process, complaining that
there was a lack of authentic evidence of the pledge of the collateral mort-
26. Actually it would appear Civil Code article 3158 properly regulates the matter but
it leads to the same conclusion.
27. 153 So. 2d 899 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
28. 370 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
29. 415 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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gage note for the debt owed by the mortgagor. The mortgagor also asserted
that there was a lack of authentic evidence of the amount of such debt,
in that the "hand note" for which the collateral note was pledged pro-
vided for a variable rate of interest based upon the "prime rate of the
Chase Manhattan Bank," and there was no evidence of what that rate
was (although the collateral mortgage note itself stipulated a "fixed" twelve
percent rate). Finally, the plaintiff contended that there was an "imper-
missible variance" between the hand note and the collateral note that
precluded use of executory process, since the hand note stipulated at-
torney's fees of twenty-five percent with a minimum of fifty dollars, while
the collateral note stipulated twenty-five percent without such a minimum.
The first circuit rejected all three arguments. It noted that the pledgee
of a collateral mortgage note is its holder and may enforce it according
to its terms.3"
Although the matter cannot be fully developed here, the writer sug-
gests that some of the difficulties encountered in understanding the work-
ings of the collateral mortgage device arise from the fact that its essence
is found in the law of pledge-not mortgage.' When a person issues his
own note in pledge to secure another note owed by him, it is difficult,
at first blush, to see how both notes can be "valid" obligations. In the
first place, there does not seem to be any consideration for the pledged
note. The maker has received nothing for issuing it. Furthermore, to say
the maker is bound on both obligations seems to lead to the conclusion
that he will have to pay twice, and one instinctively knows he only "owes,"
i.e., ultimately ought to pay, the "debt" represented by the "hand note"
(or "underlying" obligation as it is sometimes called) for which the col-
lateral note is pledged. There has thus been a tendency to speak of the
"hand note" as the "real" debt secured by the mortgage and to consider
the collateral mortgage note as only a "fictitious" obligation, recognized
by the courts to permit executory process in cases where it otherwise would
not be available but serving no other purpose.32
30. The court also relied upon Slidell Bldg. Supply v. I.D.S. Mortgage Corp., 273 So.
2d 343 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), writ denied, 274 So. 2d 708 (La. 1973) and First Nat'l
Bank v. Gaddis, 250 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
31. One can follow the early development of what is now called the collateral mort-
gage through the following cases that, in the writer's opinion at least, essentially demonstrate
the thesis herein advanced. Greenwood v. Lowe, 7 La. Ann. 197 (1852); Matthews Finley
& Co. v. Rutherford, 7 La. Ann. 225 (1852); Succession of Dolhande, 21 La. Ann. 3 (1869);
Louisiana State Bank v. Gaiennie, 21 La. Ann. 555 (1869); D'Meza v. Generes, 22 La.
Ann. 285 (1870); Miller v. Wisner, 22 La. Ann. 457 (1870); Brewer v. Gay, 24 La. Ann.
35 (1872); Merchants Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jamison, 25 La. Ann. 364 (1873); Mechanics'
& Traders' Bank v. Powell, 27 La. Ann. 647 (1875); Schepps v. Smith, 35 La. Ann. 1
(1883); Morris v. Cain, 39 La. Ann. 712, 1 So. 797 & 2 So. 418 (1887); Levy v. Ford,
41 La. Ann. 873, 6 So. 671 (1889); Succession of Phillips, 49 La. Ann. 1019, 22 So. 202
(1897).
32. "The evidence of indebtedness, then, is not the collateral mortgage note ...but
[Vol. 44
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While it is true that the reason for utilizing the collateral mortgage
device ordinarily is to permit easy access to executory process, it would
be a mistake to believe the device is limited to that purpose or that it
is not founded upon ordinary legal principles.33 These principles, however,
are not found in the law of mortgage, but in the law of pledge and,
to a considerable degree, the law of negotiable instruments. That mort-
gage law is not at the heart of the device can perhaps be demonstrated
by noting that if one secures the collateral note by some other form of
security, such as a pledge or suretyship, the questions presented will be
the same. How can one hold the surety of a note given in pledge for
another debt of the maker or execute upon a pledge securing such a note
unless it is a valid obligation to which the suretyship or pledge is an
accessory?3 ' That it is not a peculiar creation of Louisiana law is also
suggested by the fact that the collateral mortgage device is not unique
to Louisiana but is sometimes utilized in other states as well."
the hand note behind which the collateral mortgage note is pledged." Nathan & Marshall,
The Collateral Mortgage, 33 LA. L. REV. 497, 502 (1973). "The collateral mortgage note
itself represents no obligation or indebtedness at all." Crawford, Executory Process and
Collateral Mortgage-Authentic Evidence of the Hand Note, 33 LA. L. REv. 535, 536 (1973).
The collateral mortgage has also been described as a "[s]trange alchemy of the pledge of
a mortgage created by the pledgor." Sachse, Report to the Louisiana Law Institute on Arti-
cle Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 Tut. L. REV. 785, 799 (1967). This writer
obviously disagrees with these statements and suggests that they confuse the "considera-
tion" or cause for the giving of the note with the question of whether the unconditional
promise it contains to pay a sum certain to the holder is an enforceable one. "The mort-
gage note does not represent an obligation because no funds were advanced thereunder."
Crawford, supra, at 536. "[T]he mortgage note does not represent an actual debt but will
be issued as collateral to secure such debts." Nathan & Marshall, supra, at 521.
33. Few lawyers would have any difficulty approving a pledge of corporate bonds that
are regularly sold upon the market as security for the issuing corporation's debt. Indeed,
the validity of such a pledge has long been recognized throughout the country. See Wheelwright
v. St. Louis, N.O. & 0. Canal Transp. Co., 56 F. 164 (E.D. La. 1893) for an early exam-
ple of this. "Any corporation may issue bonds secured by mortgage or pledge .... The
corporation may . .. pledge .. . these bonds .. .on the terms Which the corporation
...may deem expedient." LA. R.S. 12:701(A), (D) (1969).
34. In Wm. B. Thompson & Co. v. Sporl, 160 La. 352, 107 So. 135 (1926), a note
endorsed by two of the defendants for the accomodation of the maker was pledged by
the maker to secure an open account owed by the maker to the pledgee. The court had
no difficulty finding the endorsers bound on the note to the pledgee.
35. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Kay Bee Co., 366 I1. 202, 7 N.E.2d 860 (1937);
First Nat'l City Bank v. Valentine, 62 Misc. 2d 719, 309 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
In Kay Bee, the court was faced with the interesting situation of a collateral mortgage securing
two notes of equal amount that had been separately pledged to different pledgees, one of
whom was owed an amount equal to the face amount of the collateral note and the other
somewhat more than one half of that amount. Foreclosure had not produced enough to
satisfy both obligations. One pledgee contended that the proceeds should be divided equally
in proportion to the face amount of the collateral notes. The other contended for a division
in accordance with the relative amounts of the underlying debts, claiming these were the
obligations actually secured by the mortgage. The court held that the mortgage secured
the pledged notes and divided the proceeds equally in accordance with the prevailing rule
19831
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It is settled that the pledgee of a negotiable note is its holder and,
assuming the other requisites are met, may also be a holder in due course.
As the holder the pledgee is, by definition, the person entitled to enforce
the obligation.36 His rights as a holder are, however, of mixed character.
To the extent he enforces the note to collect what is owed to him as
pledgee, he is treated as any other holder. To the extent he enforces the
note beyond that amount, he is held to be doing so for the account of
the pledgor, and the maker of the note may interpose against the claim
any defense that he could raise against the pledgor." Thus, if the maker
of a $1000 note issues it to another person without "consideration" or
"value," and the latter, before maturity, pledges it to his creditor as secur-
ity for his own $500 note, the pledgee may enforce the pledged note against
the maker to the extent of the $500 owed by his pledgor, but the maker
may raise the defense of lack of consideration to the enforcement of the
remaining $500 because the pledgee is held to be collecting that amount
that a mortgage secures several debts in proportion to their original amounts. This writer
has also participated in confecting security in Alabama property for a bank in Mobile that
regularly utilized the device.
36. It is true that a pledgee of a negotiable promissory note is not the owner
of it; but, if the note is pledged by the maker of the note, to secure a debt which
he alone owes, the pledgee has all of the rights of an owner of the note, to the
extent of the debt which it secures; and hence he may retain the note until the
debt is paid, and may sue upon it in his own name, and as an owner, at its
maturity, if it is properly indorsed. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Johnston, 117 La.
880, 42 So. 357 [1906]; Freiler Mercantile Co. v. Chaney, 146 La. 138, 83 So.
436 [1919]. . . . [Q]uoad the debt which the pledgor owes to the pledgee, the
latter has, temporarily, the rights of an owner of the note. If it were not so,
the debt represented by the pledged note would be extinguished by confusion-by
the maker's being the owner of the note.
Bank of Minden & Trust Co. v. Barron, 178 La. 1023, 1025-26, 152 So. 746, 746-47 (1934).
37. Plaintiff, therefore, as the holder (pledgee) of the notes in due course for
value and before maturity, was expressly authorized to take the necessary measure
to enforce the payment thereof. Rev. Civ. Code, art. 3170; Succn. of Dolhonde,
21 La. Ann. 3 [1869]; Ducasse v. Keyser & McKenna, 28 La. Ann. 419 [1876];
Chaffe & Sons v. DuBose, 36 La. Ann. 258 [1884]; McDonald v. Harkness, 146
La. 920, 84 So. 205 [1920]. But only to the extent of his debt is he . . . a bona
fide holder. The fundamental differences between a holder for value and a holder
as collateral security, so far as recourse against the maker is concerned, is that
the former may recover in full, and the latter, if there be equities, is restricted
to the extent of his advances. Matthews v. Rutherford, 7 La. Ann. 225 [1852],
King v. Gayoso, 8 Mart. (N. S.) 370 [1829]; Nott v. Watson, II La. Ann. 664
[1856]; Bank v. Payne, 18 La. Ann. 222 [1866] . . .; Bank v. Gaiennie, 21 La.
Ann. 555 [1869]; Gardner v. Maxwell, 27 La. Ann. 561 [1875]; Mechanics' Bldg.
Assn. v. Ferguson, 29 La. Ann. 548 [1877]; Hincks v. Converse, 38 La. Ann.
873 [1886]; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Johnston (On Rehearing) 117 La. 889, 42
So. 357 [1906].
Steeg v. Codifer, 157 La. 298, 304, 102 So. 407, 409 (1924). See also Rex Fin. Co. v.
Cary, 244 La. 675, 154 So. 2d 360 (1963); Baker Bank & Trust Co. v. Behrnes, 217 So.
2d 461 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
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solely as a fiduciary for the pledgor. Civil Code article 3170 also requires
the pledgee to apply anything he receives from the pledged property to
the satisfaction of the debt for which it is pledged and to give the surplus
to the pledgor1 8 Thus, in the example given, the $500 collected from the
maker must be applied by the pledgee to the pledgor's debt and it is
thereby extinguished.
But what if the note is pledged directly to the pledgee by its maker?
Suppose a maker pledges his own note directly to the pledgee as security
'for the debt of another person. The note contains the unqualified prom-
ise of the maker to pay a sum certain to the holder (the pledgee). If the
principal obligor defaults on his debt and the pledgee calls upon the maker
(pledgor) to perform his promise, what is the latter's defense? The most
obvious response is that he is not bound on the note because of a lack
of consideration. He received nothing for the note. Here the law of
negotiability comes into play. UCC section 3-408 codifies the rule generally
prevailing before its enactment, as follows: "Want or failure of considera-
tion is a defense as against any person not having the rights of a holder
in due course . . . except that no consideration is necessary for an instru-
ment or obligation thereon given . . . as security for an antecedent obliga-
tion of any kind." The official comments to the article also note: "The
except clause is intended to remove the difficulties which have arisen where
a note . . . is given . . .as security for a debt already owed by the
party giving it, or by a third person."3 9 The "difficulties" described in
the comments arose out of the fact that in some jurisdictions, especially
before the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, it had been decided that
a note pledged as security for an antecedent debt was unenforceable for
want of consideration." Every jurisdiction recognized that where a note
38. If the credit which has been given in pledge becomes due . . .the creditor,
by virtue of the transfer which has been made to him, shall be justified . . .
in taking measures to recover it. When received, he must apply it to the payment
of the debt due to himself, and restore the surplus, should there be any to the
person from whom he held it in pledge.
LA. Crv. CODE art. 3170.
39. U.C.C. § 3-408, comment 2, 2 U.L.A. 370 (1977) (emphasis added).
40. For an excellent discussion of the problem alluded to by the official comments
both under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the law merchant prevailing before
its general adoption see W. BRITTON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BuLLS AND NOTES § 94,
at 221-33 (2d ed. 1961). The Louisiana courts at an early stage aligned themselves on the
side of the rule now exemplified by UCC section 3-408. See Gionovich v. Citizens' Bank,
26 La. Ann. 15 (1874); Eldred v. Wicker, 273 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). It
should be noted that in considering the matter, the courts do not distinguish whose note
is being pledged. The problem is the same whether the maker pledges his own note for
his own debt or for the debt of another. Of course, if a payee or subsequent holder pledges
the note in such a manner as to constitute the pledgee a holder in due course, the question
does not arise because lack of consideration is not a real defense assertable against such
a holder.
19831
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was pledged as security for a loan to be made either to the maker or
to a third person, the extension of the credit was sufficient consideration
to support the promise of the maker. This is also the reason that the
exception in section 3-408 is limited to a note given for an antecedent
debt. It is only when a note is given after the obligation for which it
is pledged is incurred that the question of consideration for the note
becomes relevant.
Thus, in the example given, the pledgee may enforce the maker's
promise in the note. He may do so, however, only to the extent that'
the principal obligor is indebted to him. If he attempts to collect more,
he is, under the rule previously mentioned, doing so for the account of
the pledgor and must return the surplus of what he collects to the pledgor.
In this case, the pledgor is the maker of the note. One can hardly enforce
an obligation for the account of a person who is himself the obligor.
As a result of the interplay between the two rules, anything the pledgee
collects upon the pledged note must also be applied to the obligation for
which it is pledged, thus reducing it; correlatively, anything the principal
obligor pays on his obligation will also reduce the amount that can be
collected from the pledgor as the maker of the pledged note.
What if the pledged note is that of the principal obligor? Consider
the case when a person has borrowed $1000 from another and has given
him a note evidencing his obligation to repay it. Suppose further that
the maker then borrows $500 from yet a third person. If the payee of
the first note should pledge the maker's note to the payee of the second
note to secure its payment, the pledgee would then hold two notes of
the same person. If the pledgee enforces the note pledged to him (as he
might want to do if it were secured by a mortgage) and collects $1000,
that note would be extinguished. The pledgee is bound under the terms
of the pledge to apply $500 of the proceeds to the maker's other note
(the "hand note") and to return the excess to the pledgor. Both notes
have been extinguished and the pledgor has a claim against the maker
for reimbursement of the $500 of his money that has been used to satisfy
the maker's other debt.
It has long been held, in commercial matters generally, that the rights
of a pledgee do not depend upon whether the note is first issued to a
third person who then pledges it for the maker's debt or is issued directly
by the maker to the payee as security for his other debts. In each case,
the pledgee is its holder and the note is enforceable to the extent of the
underlying debt for which it is pledged."' "[T]he proposition that the
41. In Matthews Finley & Co. v. Rutherford, 7 La. Ann. 225 (1852), the defendant
issued a note to a friend (without consideration) to permit the latter to "raise money"
on it by selling it. Instead, the friend pledged it to secure his debt to the plaintiff. The
court held the pledgee could enforce it notwithstanding the lack of consideration. In Suc-
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pledgee of a negotiable paper is a holder for value whenever, under the
same circumstances, a purchaser would be, is too clear to admit of doubt
or discussion, both upon principle and upon authority.
2
If these principles are correct, and if a lack or failure of considera-
tion is no defense to the enforcement of a promisory note given as security
for a debt (even the debt of the maker, as the law declares), then when
a person gives his own note as security for another obligation the note
given in pledge is a "real" obligation and the pledgee is its holder. If
that note is secured by a mortgage (or any other form of security, for
that matter), the mortgage is truly accessory to it and may be enforced
to the extent the note itself may be enforced. However, this Will never
be more than the amount due on the collateral note by its own terms,
as this is the obligation secured by the mortgage. Neither can the note
be enforced for more than the amount of the obligation for which the
note is pledged, since the pledgee, as holder, is deemed to be enforcing
the note above that amount for the account of the pledgor, who is the
obligor of the note being enforced.
Of course, this analysis does not answer the question of whether a
holder of a collateral mortgage note, when proceeding by executory pro-
cess, must "prove" it is pledged and if so the amount of the debt for
which it is pledged. Again, under ordinary principles the answer should
be no. The holder of the collateral mortgage note must prove by authen-
tic evidence the collateral mortgage note itself, the authentic act of mort-
gage securing it and importing a confession of judgment, and that he
is the holder of the note. The holder need prove nothing further to recover
under executory process. 3 When one proves he is the holder of a prom-
issory note that is due by its terms, any defense of the maker that he
does not owe what he has promised to pay is an affirmative one that
need not be negated by the plaintiff."" Any note, "collateral" or other-
wise, in the hands of a plaintiff may have been partially or fully paid,
been given for defective consideration or no consideration at all, or may
have otherwise been extinguished by any of the means by which obliga-
cession of Dolhonde, 21 La. Ann. 3 (1869), the decedent had issued a note secured by
a mortgage to a friend who then returned it to the maker who then pledged it to secure
a debt owed by his firm. Again the court held the pledgee was a holder and entitled to
enforce the note. This latter case appears to be the genesis of the practice of using a "fic-
titious" or "nominal" mortgagee for collateral mortgages and also of the rule that a col-
lateral mortgage note may be issued and reissued, contrary to the rule pertaining to the
so called "direct" mortgage. Cf. Hill v. Hill, 4 Rob. 416 (La. 1843).
42. H. DENIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE CONTRACT OF PLEDGE § 319, at 274
(1898); see also cases cited W. BRITTON, supra note 40, § 94, at 226 n.9.
43. LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 2635.
44. See W. BRITTON, supra note 40, § 94, at 221-33. The courts in this connection,
again, do not distinguish the note pledged directly by the maker for his own debt from
one pledged for the debt of another.
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tions are extinguished. The plaintiff suing on a bearer note (or one payable
to his order) in an executory or ordinary proceeding has never been re-
quired to introduce evidence to negate these possibilities. Neither has he
been required to prove how or in what capacity he obtained the note.
It is enough that he proves he is the holder and that the note is due.4 1
This is not to say that in seeking relief the plaintiff may justifiably
pray for more than is owed to him. The plaintiff who verifies a petition
and claims more than he knows to be due him may commit perjury, but
if he prays for less than is apparently due by the terms of the note he
holds, he is not required to prove why less is owed. The note past due
according to its terms is evidence presumptively that the maker owes what
he has unconditionally promised to pay.
PRIVILEGES
The Private Works Act
The Private Works Act provides that if a claimant has properly filed
a notice of privilege, the general contractor may provide a surety bond
for the claim and secure extinction of the privilege.4 6 The most obvious
reason for permitting this is to free the property of the privilege when
the amount or validity of the claim is disputed so the matter can be
litigated by the contractor and the claimant without taking the property
out of commerce. This is not, however, the only reason why such a bond
might be sought or given, and the statute does not limit the right of the
contractor to the "bonding out" of claims that are disputed. In Groom
v. W.H. Ward Lumber Co., 41 the first circuit rejected the claim of a surety
who gave such a bond after a default judgment had been rendered against
the contractor establishing the validity of the claim and recognizing the
privilege."' Although it is not entirely clear from the facts, it appears the
surety was not aware the suit was pending and may have been induced
45. Defendant argues that . . . as its title to the notes was only as pledgee, it
devolved upon plaintiff to prove that there was some amount due it by Smith
[the pledgor] which the notes were pledged to secure. . . . It is well settled that
a pledgee may sue on a pledged note as "holder and owner" with the same effect
as the true owner could do. . . . We do not think there is any merit in this
contention.
Commercial Nat'l Bank v. McDaniel, 156 So. 43, 47 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934). See City
of New Orleans v. Pigniolo, 29 La. Ann. 835 (1877); Federal Land Bank v. Hall, 171 So.
418 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936); Hercules Realty Co. v. Streetly & Chadwick, 12 Orl. App.
155 (La. 1914). For examples of the well established rule that payment is an affirmative
defense that need not be proven in a suit on a note, see McRae v. Purvis, Gladden &
Co., 12 La. Ann. 85 (1857); Plantation Acceptance Corp. v. Stone, 379 So. 2d 782 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 24 (La. 1980).
46. LA. R.S. 9:4835 (1983).
47. 432 So. 2d 985 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
48. Whether the Act in fact permits a contractor or owner against whom a judgment
has been rendered at that late date to provide a "security bond" for an executory claim
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to give the security for what he thought was a disputed and perhaps in-
valid claim. The decision is clearly correct. The bond authorized by the
Act permits a contractor to substitute the promise of a surety for the
privilege held by a claimant surety as security for his claim. It is hard
to see how a surety, who has undertaken to pay a claim if the contractor
does not, can exonerate himself because the debt he has guaranteed is
in fact owed and has become fixed by a judgment.
Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchanan,'4 9 another decision by the Louisiana
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals involving the implications of the Private
Works Act, does not seem to be as well founded as Groom. The defen-
dant verbally agreed to sell a house and lot he owned to a prospective
purchaser and further agreed that, pending closing of the transaction, the
purchaser could remodel the bathroom in the house. The purchaser con-
tracted with the plaintiff to perform the work, falsely warranting that
he was the owner of the property. The work was completed, but the sale
of the land never took place. The plaintiff timely filed a privilege under
the Private Works Act and brought suit to enforce it. The owner resisted
on the grounds that while the Act gives a privilege for work undertaken
by an "owner, ' ' 0 it also defines an "owner" as any person having an
interest in or over the property, and it limits the effect of the privilege
to the interest in the immovable of the particular "owner" who contracts
for the work." The court agreed and held that since the work was under-
taken by the prospective purchaser and not the owner of the land, the
latter had no liability under the Act. The privilege did not affect his
interest.
The court noted that under the predecessor to the present act, owners
who did not contract for the work had sometimes been held responsible
in cases where they had led third persons to believe either that the work
was being done for their account or that the person contracting for the
work was in fact the owner."2 The court observed, however, that such
was not at issue. Certainly, having done so without objection of the claimant, neither the
contractor nor the surety should be entitled to raise the question.
49. 428 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
50. LA. R.S. 9:4802 (1983).
51. LA. R.S. 9:4806(C) (1983).
52. Fruge v. Muffoletto, 242 La. 569, 137 So. 2d 336 (La. 1962); Meadowview Park
Subdiv. v. Morrison, 130 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). The latter case is instructive
of the kind of situation that might give rise to such a holding. A prospective purchaser
of an unimproved lot began constructing a house on it. He posted signs, apparently with
the knowledge of the owner, which indicated that he was a contractor, thus creating, in
the eyes of the court, the impression that he was doing work for the owner. A materialman
of the "contractor" was permitted to assert his privilege against the owner who was held
estopped to deny he had in fact authorized the work. While one might question its applica-
tion in the particular case, the rule itself is nothing more than the normal consequences
of the doctrine of estoppel.
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cases were founded upon principles of estoppel and were limited to situa-
tions in which the claimant had been led by the owner to believe that
the owner was in fact performing the work or that the person doing it
was his contractor.
There are many instances in which a person who is not the owner
of an immovable may lawfully make improvements to it. Lessees, ser-
vitude owners, usufructuaries and naked owners, for example, may all
make improvements to immovables they do not own. Furthermore, a per-
son may also make improvements to land without the consent of its
owner-such as where he is a possessor in good or bad faith or even
just a trespasser. To impose liability, under the Act, on the owner of
the land in such cases either because he has granted to another the right
to modify his land or because another does so without his consent, would
make him a virtual insurer of the price of the work." The policy of the
Act is clearly to limit the owner's liability (and that of his property) to
cases where he has directly undertaken the work himself or where he has
undertaken it through a contract with another. 4
After concluding that the Act does not extend its protection to per-
sons in the position of the contractor before it, the court in Buchanan
held, however, that the contractor could nonetheless recover from the
owner on the basis of unjust enrichment. Although the matter is somewhat
beyond the scope of this work, this writer suggests that this conclusion
is wrong. The requirements for application of the doctrine of unjust enrich-
ment have been articulated by the supreme court as being (1) an enrich-
ment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a connection between the two, (4) a
lack of justification or cause for the enrichment and impoverishment, and
(5) an absence of any other remedy to the impoverished party.5 Apply-
53. As a matter of fact, if the Act applied, he would have unlimited personal liability
for the cost of the work unless the work were done by a general contractor for whom
a proper bond was given. LA. R.S. 9:4802 (1983).
54. LA. R.S. 9:4801 defines the principal obligation to which the privilege is an ac-
cessory as being a contractual claim against the owner by the person enjoying the privilege.
LA. R.S. 9:4802, dealing with work undertaken through contractors, limits the privileges
and personal liability of the owner to claims by persons dealing with a contractor of the
owner. The owner's personal liability is also defined by the same section as "securing"
the claim of one who has a contractual relationship directly or by subcontract with such
a contractor. This is not to say that such a privilege might not attach to the claim of the
purchaser for reimbursement for the improvements if one exists under Civil Code article
495. Since the Private Works Act defines a possessor, lessee, or any other person having
the right to the use of the immovable as an owner and further provides that the privilege
affects such owner's interest in or over the immovable, it might well be maintained that
the rights of reimbursement given by Civil Code articles 495-497 to possessors or others
who improve land not owned by them are subject to the privilege. Cf. LA. Civ. CODE art.
524. The court did not consider this possibility, apparently because it was not urged upon
it by the plaintiff.
55. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974); Minyard v.
Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967).
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ing these criteria, the court in Buchanan found (1) that the owners had
benefited "from the installation of the more luxurious bathrooms"56 in
their home, (2) that the contractor was impoverished because he had done
the work at his expense, (3) that the "connection" was the "failure of
the owner to take steps to prevent the harm which he could have or should
have forseen,"" (4) that there was a lack of cause or justification for
the enrichment and impoverishment since there was no contractual rela-
tionship between the owner and contractor, and (5) that the contractor
obviously had no remedy under the Act.
When a person enters into a contract with another, the performance
of which may directly (or indirectly) benefit a third person, and the con-
tract is breached after performance by one of the parties, the enrichment
of the third person is not without a just "cause" nor does the impoverished
party lack a remedy for his impoverishment. The breach of the contract
is the cause of the impoverishment and the offended party clearly has
a cause of action against the offending party. That the "impoverished"
party may have dealt with a person who did not or could not perform
his obligation or failed to get security for that performance is not the
same as saying he has no remedy. Neither is his impoverishment "con-
nected" to the benefit enjoyed by the third person. It can hardly be said
(as it was in the present case) that a third person, not a party to a con-
tract and having no duty to either party to it, should take steps to pro-
tect one of the parties to the contract from the consequences of its breach
by the other. In the instant case, if the prospective purchaser had paid
the price of the work, the contractor would have had no complaint. To
say the owner could have or should have taken steps to "prevent this"
is to say not only that he should have anticipated the work would be
done, but that he had a duty to the contractor to take steps to see that
the purchaser would pay the contractor.
The very purpose of the requirement that the enrichment have taken
place "without justification or cause" is to restrict application of the doc-
trine to cases where the so-called "impoverished" party has undertaken
the activity without otherwise having a valid reason for doing so, thus
rendering the enrichment "unjustified." In Edmonston v. A-Second Mort-
gage Co." the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly explained the require-
ment in question as follows:
"Cause" is not in this instance assigned the meaning commonly
associated with contracts, but, rather, it means that the enrich-
ment is justified if it is the result of, or finds its explanation in,
the terms of a valid juridical act between the impoverishee .
56. 428 So. 2d at 845.
57. Id.
58. 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
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. and the enrichee . . . or between a third party . . . and the
enrichee."1
In the present case the owner agreed that if the prospective purchaser
would purchase his house he would let him do certain work to it. 6 The
latter entered into a contract to do so with the contractor. He apparently
failed to perform either contract." The cause or reason for the enrich-
ment was obviously the contract between the owner and the purchaser,
and the cause for the impoverishment was the contract between the pur-
chaser and the contractor. All of these parties expected to profit from
their arrangements. The fact that the purchaser failed to carry out either
contract does not mean the owner has been "unjustly enriched" because
his house is now "improved." He may not have desired to have the work
done, and, more importantly, even if the value of his house is enhanced,
the increase in value may be less than the damages he has suffered because
of the breach of the contract of sale by the purchaser. He may also have
a cause of action to require the purchaser to return the house to its former
condition even if it has been "enhanced."
The reason for limiting the doctrine to cases where the enrichment
does not occur as a result of a contract between the person being en-
riched and another and where the impoverished party does not have
another remedy is partly, at least, to avoid making one who contracts
with another the guarantor of every contract the latter makes to carry
out the first contract. The Private Works Act is a carefully and intri-
cately constructed act designed to make an exception to the ordinary rule
that one is not bound to pay the debts of one's independent contractor
in cases where, as a matter of policy, the law desires to impose upon
an owner responsibility for providing some assurance to those who pro-
vide labor or materials to his contractor that they will be paid. If the
default by a contractor to those with whom he contracted alone gave rise
to an action for unjust enrichment against the owner because his prop-
erty has been improved, the Private Works Act would have been largely
unnecessary.
If the legislature extends liability in cases where it would not exist
under general contract principles, but carefully limits and defines the cir-
cumstances and conditions for the imposition of such liability, it is dif-
ficult to see how a court could hold that it is "unjust" not to extend
it further. One of the dangers inherent in the action for unjust enrich-
ment is that, unless carefully limited, it can be used to swallow up all
59. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
60. It is true that the agreement was apparently a verbal one, but the court obviously
considered this irrelevant, as it should be.
61. The court noted the apparent cause of his breach was the fact that he was con-
victed of and sentenced to prison "on unrelated fraud charges." Buchanan, 428 So. 2d at 842.
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of the law of contract and property. The requirements for its application,
as articulated by the supreme court, are designed to restrict its use to
those cases where one truly receives a windfall from another and it would
be unjust not to require some form of restitution. It is not intended to
shield a person who enters into what turns out to be an unwise or im-
provident contract from the consequences of its breach because someone
else, with whom he has not dealt, may have benefited from his
performance.
Privileges of Vessels
The pervasive admiralty jurisdiction of the United States has rendered
many of the provisions of the Civil Code affecting ships and other vessels
obsolete. One area in which state law still applies, however, is in the con-
struction of such vessels. Civil Code article 3237 establishes a privilege
"on the price of ships and other vessels" for "sums due to sellers, to
those who have furnished materials and to workmen employed in the con-
struction of a vessel" that has never made a voyage. In P.B.C. Systems
v. L.A.D. Construction Co.,62 the first circuit recognized this privilege
as a nonmaritime lien entitled to recognition. The court also held that
the Civil Code imposes no personal liability upon the owner of the vessel
for the debt secured by the privilege; it does, however, give the secured
party a right of pursuit, permitting seizure of the vessel in the hands of
a subsequent purchaser for up to six months after the sale or until the
vessel undertakes her first voyage.63
62. 428 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
63. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3242.
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